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Abstract: We propose a conjecture that self-serving but generous actions diminish 
the positively reciprocal response, compared to selfless generous actions.  We embed 
our conjecture in Cox, Friedman & Sadiraj’s (2008) model of Revealed Altruism.  
According to Revealed Altruism reciprocal responses are influenced by a ‘more 
generous than’ (MGT) ordering.  The MGT ordering is defined by two conditions. 
Condition A states that an action that increases one’s opportunity set is MGT an 
action that decreases, does not change, or increases the opportunity set by less.  
Condition B states that the action cannot increase the ‘giver’s’ opportunity set by 
more than the ‘recipient’s’ opportunity set. We focus on Condition B, and classify 
actions that satisfy Condition B as selfless generous actions, and actions that violate 
Condition B as self-serving generous actions. We hypothesize that selfless generous 
actions are MGT self-serving generous actions, and that self-serving generous actions 
will result in a diminished reciprocal response. We test this conjecture using two 
novel experimental designs and find evidence that subjects perceive self-serving 
generous actions as being less generous than selfless generous actions, but no 
empirical support for our conjecture on the diminished reciprocal response, 
suggesting a refinement for the MGT ordering that does not include Condition B. 
Keywords: Reciprocity, generosity, self-serving, experiment, Revealed Altruism, lost 
wallet game, investment game 
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 “If you’re helping someone and expecting something in return, you’re doing business 
not kindness.”  
Unknown. 
1. Introduction 
Do you care whether a person is genuinely generous to you or whether he just 
pretends to be so he could reap future benefits? Does your response to his generous 
action depend on whether his behavior is potentially self-serving? Consider the 
following example. You are at a restaurant in a country with a tipping culture and the 
waiter is providing an extraordinary service. You realize that his kindness might be 
disingenuous and that he might be pretending to be nice in order to extract a higher 
tip. How do you tip him? Do you care about the possible motivations behind his 
action, which while being beneficial to you, was potentially more beneficial to him? 
Do you then elect to not reward him with a higher tip or do you tip well, in excess of 
what you normally tip, because you had a pleasant dining experience thanks to his 
service? 
In this paper we ask whether a self-serving generous action leads to a weaker 
positively reciprocal response than a selfless generous action. As reciprocity is 
particularly sensitive to perceived intentions (e.g., Charness, 2004; Gneezy, Güth & 
Verboven 2000; Kritikos & Bolle, 2004) distinguishing between selfless and self-
serving acts is important for understanding of the origins of reciprocal behavior. In 
our explorations we connect to the Revealed Altruism theory (Cox, Friedman & 
Sadiraj, 2008, henceforth CFS), which defines self-serving generosity as a giver’s 
(henceforth, First Mover or FM) action that directly benefits the recipient (henceforth, 
Second Mover or SM) by increasing her maximum payoff, while also benefiting the 
FM by increasing his own maximum payoff by more than that of the SM. Similarly, if 
the action results in a smaller increase (or a decrease) in the FM’s maximum payoff, 
we classify this as selfless generosity. Based on the logic presented in Revealed 
Altruism, we postulate that a self-serving generous action will result in a diminished 
reciprocal response compared to a selfless generous action. We test our conjecture in 
two experiments that allow us to vary whether a generous action is self-serving or not. 
We find evidence that subjects perceive self-serving generous actions as being less 
generous than selfless generous actions, but no support for our conjecture on the 
diminished reciprocal response. Our results suggest a parsimonious refinement of 
Revealed Altruism theory. 
Previous research provides vast evidence that many economic transactions are 
governed by reciprocity (see Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Camerer, 2003; Sobel, 2005; Fehr 
& Schmidt, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2008 for surveys). The motivations behind actions have 
been identified as an important driving factor of both positively (Cox, 2004; Cox, 
Sadiraj & Sadiraj, 2008; Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2008) and negatively reciprocal 
behavior (Blount, 1995; Offerman, 2002). The experimental designs studying the role 
of intentions allow for their presence in one condition and remove them in the control 
condition by either implementing the choice of the decision-maker exogenously by 
the experimenter (e.g., Cox, 2004), using a randomizing device (e.g., Cox & Deck, 
2005), or by forcing a particular choice through limiting the choice set to one 
alternative (e.g., McCabe, Rigdon & Smith, 2003).  
Bruni, Corazzini & Stanca (2009) go one step further and vary the nature of 
intentions. Subjects in their experiment play a two-stage game in which the FM 
chooses how much of his 20-token endowment to send to the SM. The amount sent is 
multiplied by 3, the amount kept is not transformed. In the second stage, the SM 
makes an identical decision using his own endowment. Bruni et al. vary whether or 
not the FM knows that there is a second stage. When he does not know, the 
motivation for his generosity is purely intrinsic. However, when the FM knows that 
the SM can reciprocate his generous action, the FM’s motivation can be intrinsic 
and/or extrinsic. Bruni et al. find that the SMs respond to possible motivation behind 
FM’s generosity and reward them more when extrinsic motives can be ruled out. 
Notice, however, that while while the FM could be strategic, he is not self-serving as 
defined above, since his action increases the opportunity set of the SM, but decreases 
his own, irrespectively of the condition. Nonetheless, given that people respond to the 
nature of intentions, it is possible that self-serving intentions behind a generous action 
could influence how others respond to that action in a reciprocal fashion. 
Anecdotal and scientific evidence thus demonstrates that the intensity of reciprocal 
reactions often depends on the perceived intent. Intent, however, is hard to read out 
from actions. Cox, Servátka & Vadovič (2016) conduct an experiment testing whether 
acts of commission reveal intent to a greater degree and therefore lead to a stronger 
reciprocal response than acts of omission. They indeed find that acts of commission, 
which actively impose kindness or harm, generate stronger reciprocity than acts of 
omission, which represent failures to act kindly or to prevent harm. In their 
experiment a generous act increases the opportunity set of the SM, but is selfless; 
hence their data do not (and are not intended to) permit a conclusion as to whether the 
SM respond to the FM’s action being self-serving or not.  
What do the existing models tell us about the importance of self-serving intentions for 
reciprocal behavior? Distributional preference theories (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) describe preferences over the final distributions of 
payoffs, with no considerations for how surplus is generated. Motivations behind 
actions, such as self-serving generosity, are not considered when decision-makers 
make their consequential choices; therefore such models do not shed any light on our 
research question.  
Belief-dependent models of reciprocity by Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 
(2004), or Falk & Fischbacher (2006) incorporate intentions through the SM’s beliefs 
about the kindness of the FM. For illustration, consider Falk & Fischbacher’s (2006) 
model that defines a kindness term, which is then used to determine the extent of 
reciprocal response. The kindness term consists of an intention factor and an outcome 
factor. The intention factor represents how intentional a FM is being in making a 
decision, as it is based on the presence of other decisions and how feasible they are. 
The outcome factor is the difference between the expected payoffs of the FM and SM. 
This outcome factor is calculated given the SM’s beliefs about the other’s actions (a 
first-order belief), and their beliefs about the FM’s beliefs about the SM’s own actions 
(a second-order belief). If the kindness factor is positive, the action is considered kind, 
and if the kindness factor is negative, the action is considered unkind. SMs will want 
to reward kind actions and punish unkind actions, depending on how reciprocal they 
are. All actions that meet our definition of self-serving generosity would be 
considered unkind, as the outcome term is negative. This is at odds with the fact that 
the action is still generous and hence also with our conjecture that people will still 
reward generous but self-serving actions, just less so. Falk & Fischbacher’s model 
thus predicts that SMs will respond positively to selfless generous actions and 
negatively to self-serving generous actions, meaning we should observe a difference 
in the reciprocal response of the two types of generous actions. Nonetheless, whether 
an action is considered self-serving or not depends entirely on the SM’s beliefs. While 
in principle it is possible to influence beliefs in experiments (e.g. through framing), in 
the given scenario they remain outside of our control. This makes testing our 
conjecture troublesome in a belief-dependent framework.  
Charness & Rabin (2002) incorporate intentions by having the SM lose other-
regarding considerations towards the FM if the FM ‘misbehaves’ by acting 
inconsistently with some 'social consensus’. However, Charness & Rabin assume 
SMs have quasi-maximin preferences, according to which people care about social 
welfare, so it is not clear how the SM would react to a self-serving generous action 
that always improves social welfare compared to a selfless generous action that would 
increase social welfare by less, or in some instances decrease social welfare. SMs may 
then lose other-regarding preferences for those that undertook a selfless generous 
action, which is the opposite of our conjecture. Furthermore, different assumptions 
about social consensus would have different implications for the SM’s response, 
therefore an a priori criterion for specifying the social consensus with respect to self-
serving generosity would be necessary to make a testable prediction. 
An appropriate theory of reciprocity to embed our explorations in would either have, 
or allow for introducing, considerations for self-serving motivations, and provide us 
with clear and testable hypotheses on observables. Such a theory, not dependent on 
beliefs, is that of Revealed Altruism (Cox, Friedman & Sadiraj, 2008). In this theory 
CFS posit that an action that is more generous than another is met with a more 
(conditionally) altruistic response. CFS define an action from a FM being ‘more 
generous than’ (MGT) another to the SM if it meets two conditions. The first 
condition is that between any two actions, the one that offers the higher SM maximum 
potential income induces higher generosity. A second requirement is that the increase 
of the FM’s maximum potential income does not exceed the increase in the SM’s 
maximum potential income. In other words, the action cannot be self-serving. As the 
feasible maximum potential incomes of an opportunity set are properly defined, 
generosity in this theory is determined in an observable and unambiguous way, unlike 
in psychological games that work with individual’s beliefs. We therefore use 
Revealed Altruism as our framework. In addition, this theory includes considerations 
for people being self-serving (through the second condition), making Revealed 
Altruism a suitable starting point for exploring our research question. 
However, Revealed Altruism makes no predictions about the reciprocal response to 
self-serving but generous actions. Rather, it states that actions cannot be self-serving, 
meaning self-serving generosity is outside the scope of the theory. In the current 
paper, we expand the Revealed Altruism theory by positing that self-serving actions 
will elicit a diminished reciprocal response than self-serving actions, and provide 
experimental evidence to test our conjecture. Support for our conjecture would 
confirm the second condition as an important part of MGT ordering, whereas lack of 
support could suggest that the MGT ordering is adequately described by the first 
condition alone, providing a refinement of Revealed Altruism. 
CFS provide some support for their second condition, using data from Andreoni, 
Harbaugh & Vesterlund’s (2003) Carrot & Stick game. In the Carrot & Stick game, 
the FM can split $2.40 between himself and the SM, with a minimum of 40 cents 
being sent to the SM. The game has three variants, the Carrot Game, in which the SM 
can spend 1 cent to reward the FM by 5 cents, the Stick Game, in which the SM can 
spend 1 cent to punish the FM by 5 cents, and the Carrot & Stick Game, in which the 
SM can either reward or punish the FM at the rates previously described. If we 
compare the Stick variant to the Carrot & Stick variant, the same FM split decision 
differ in their MGT ordering according to the second condition. This is because SMs 
cannot reward FMs in the Stick variant, making generosity selfless, compared to the 
potentially self-serving generosity in the Carrot & Stick variant. While CFS do report 
statistical evidence in support of our conjecture, this is not sufficient to answer our 
research question. Firstly, the evidence is a by-product of an experimental design that 
was not created with the intention of testing our conjecture. Evidence from a direct 
test will be more appropriate. Secondly, SM’s action sets change between only being 
able to punish (or do nothing), to being able to punish and reward (or do nothing).  
Such a change could influence behavior for reasons other than self-serving generosity. 
For example, SMs may have a desire to do ‘something’ in an experiment and have 
some influence on final payouts. Therefore, SMs may want to punish in the Stick 
variant but want to reward in the Carrot & Stick variant. This concept is related to the 
‘active participation hypothesis’ (Lei, Noussair & Plott, 2001), and also observations 
in changes in individual behavior between Dictator games where FMs could ‘give’ 
money to the SM, or ‘take’ money from the SM (e.g. Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen et al., 
2013; Cox et al., 2016).  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1.Revealed Altruism Theory 
The following section provides a comprehensive overview of Revealed Altruism and 
embeds our conjecture in its framework. CFS develop a model of reciprocity in the 
spirit of neoclassical economic theory. Suppose there are two players, ‘me’, and 
‘you’.2 Let ‘my’ income be denoted m and ‘your’ income be denoted y. ‘My’ 
preferences over m and y are smooth, convex and strictly increasing in m. Well-
behaved preference can be represented by a general utility function denoted u(m,y), 
which has a positive partial derivative with respect to m, or 
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑚
> 0, meaning 
‘my’ utility is increasing in m. The partial derivative with respect to y, 
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
, could 
be zero everywhere if ‘I’ am selfish, or could be positive or negative depending on 
‘my’ benevolence or malevolence, respectively. The marginal rate of substitution of m 
for y, is represented in Equation 1. 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑦 =
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
,  (1) 
Equation 1 is undefined for selfish preferences (as 
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
= 0), and swings from +∞ 
to -∞ as preferences pass from slight benevolence to slight malevolence, so it is 
convenient to instead use willingness to pay, as presented in Equation 2. 
 𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  
1
𝑀𝑅𝑆
=
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑚
= 𝑤.  (2) 
The willingness to pay, w, represents the amount of m ‘I’ am willing to give up in 
order to increase y by one unit. Note that w is intrinsic, i.e., it is invariant to 
monotonic transformations of u(.). A more altruistic than (MAT) preference ordering 
is defined as follows. Let A and B be two preference orderings over m and y. A is 
MAT B if, for a given domain D, 𝑤𝐴(𝑚, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑤𝐵(𝑚, 𝑦), ∀(𝑚, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐷, or in other 
words, ‘my’ willingness to pay in A either exceeds or is equal to ‘my’ willingness to 
pay in B, at any allocation (m,y) from D.   
‘Your’ action creates an opportunity set, F. Let 𝑦𝐹
∗  be ‘your’ maximum feasible 
income in F, and similarly let 𝑚𝐹
∗  be ‘my’ maximum feasible income in F. An action 
that creates an opportunity set G is considered MGT an action that creates an 
opportunity set F if it meets the following two conditions presented in Equations 3 
and 4: 
  Condition A. 𝑚𝐺
∗ − 𝑚𝐹
∗ ≥ 0  (3) 
Condition B. 𝑚𝐺
∗ − 𝑚𝐹
∗ ≥ 𝑦𝐺
∗ − 𝑦𝐹
∗  (4) 
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 The theory is general (N players), however, the two player case is presented for ease of explanation. 
We present the theory in its original version, where ‘me’ represents the SM and ‘you’ the FM. 
In other words, Condition A states that G is MGT F, if G provides ‘me’ with at least 
as much if not more potential income than F. Condition B states the set G cannot 
increase ‘your’ potential income by more than ‘mine’, compared to F.  
The Revealed Altruism model includes two axioms, Axiom R and Axiom S. Axiom R 
refers to reciprocity, the concept of rewarding (or punishing) good (bad) actions. 
More formally, Axiom R states:  
“Let the first mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second mover 
from the collection C. If F,G ∈ C and G is MGT F, then 𝐴𝐺  is MAT 𝐴𝐹.”
3
 
 (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008, p. 40).  
Therefore, if the opportunity set following your action is MGT of an alternative 
feasible opportunity set, then it will be met with a MAT response. In other words, if 
‘your’ action increases ‘my’ potential earnings without increasing ‘yours’ by more, 
then my choice will be more generous.  
Axiom S, which however is not relevant for our research question, states that acts of 
commission elicit stronger reciprocal response than acts of omission.  
2.2.Conjecture and Extension of Revealed Altruism 
It is with the preceding framework in mind that we present our conjectures on self-
serving generosity. Condition B (Equation 4) is related to the proposed concept of 
self-serving generosity. It effectively states that two opportunity sets cannot be MGT 
ordered if a generous action is self-serving. Condition B could be interpreted as a 
domain in which, when it is satisfied, predictions from the Revealed Altruism theory 
are defined. Outside of this domain the CFS version of the theory does not offer 
predictions. We next posit how Condition B affects the MGT ordering. 
If the inequality of Condition B is not satisfied, this could affect the MGT ordering. 
We define an action that satisfies Condition B as a selfless action. A selfless action 
potentially benefits the recipient by more (or at least as much) as the proposer, and it 
is unambiguous that the action is generous. We define an action that violates 
Condition B as self-serving. In the case of a self-serving action, the FM potentially 
stands to gain more than the SM, so the FM’s kind intentions of any generous but 
self-serving action are not clearly revealed. We propose that if both actions are equal 
in MGT ordering according to Condition A (i.e. they both make the recipient equally 
better off), a selfless action is considered MGT a self-serving action. If a MGT action 
elicits a MAT response, we therefore posit that a selfless action will elicit a MAT 
response than a self-serving action.   
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 𝐴𝑋 is the preference ordering after observing the action that creates opportunity set X, where X ∈ C. 
Figure 1 presents our conjecture graphically in terms of opportunity sets over my 
income (m), and your income (y). Consider the status quo opportunity set F, where 
𝑦𝐹
∗ = 𝑚𝐺
∗ = 5, and three alternative opportunity sets G, H, and I, where 𝑚∗ = 6, but 
𝑦∗ varies. Opportunity sets G and H satisfy both Condition A and Condition B and are 
thus MGT F. Opportunity set I satisfies by Condition A but not Condition B. Note, 
we cannot specify an MGT ordering of G, H, and I by Condition A alone, instead we 
refer to Condition B. We propose that G is MGT F, H, and I; H is MGT F and I; and I 
is MGT F. 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of selfless and self-serving generosity. 
3. Experiment 1  
In general it is quite difficult to acquire data on reciprocal behavior from everyday 
situations, due to the private nature of many interactions. Even if such interactions 
were observable, it would be difficult to infer intent, as there are numerous other 
considerations at play. For example, interaction between two parties is often subject to 
repetition and motivations may therefore include reputation-building. Even in one-
shot interactions, there are motivations such as social norms or social pressure that 
could confound any attempt to investigate the impact of self-serving actions on 
reciprocity. A solution is to conduct a one-shot interaction in controlled laboratory 
conditions. The non-repeated nature of the interaction strips away some motivations 
not related to the research question, and a sufficiently calibrated design removes any 
remaining confounds, leaving only the motivations in question to be studied. 
3.1.Design 
To explore our conjecture, we employ the Lost Wallet Game, henceforth LWG 
(Dufwenberg & Gneezy 2000). In the LWG, presented in Figure 2, a First Mover can 
choose either IN or OUT. If the FM chooses OUT, he receives his outside option x, 
and the Second Mover receives nothing. If the FM chooses IN, then $20 is made 
available for the SM to split between the pair with y going to the FM and 20-y to the 
SM. 
Our objective is to test whether a violation of Condition B affects the reciprocal 
response, and in order to do so, we hold all other factors that could affect the MGT 
ordering constant, mainly Condition A. In the LWG Condition A is constant 
regardless of x, as the SM always stands to gain up to $20. We can make changes to 
Condition B by varying x, which will vary how beneficial it is to the FM to choose 
IN, and subsequently how selfless or self-serving choosing IN is. 
 
 
Figure 2 – The Lost Wallet Game 
 
As the FM stands to gain up to 20-x, for all positive x, choosing IN is selfless, as the 
FM’s maximum potential income will always be less than the SM’s (who always 
stands to gain up to 20). In order to make choosing IN self-serving, we implement a 
negative x, which makes our implementation of the LWG novel and unique. We 
therefore propose two treatments, a Selfless treatment where x=4, and a Self-Serving 
FM 
OUT x 
0 
IN 
SM 
0 20 
y 
y 
20-y 
treatment where x=-2.
4
 Intuitively, a FM is being selfless when he gives up $4 to 
choose IN, compared to when he gains $2 by choosing IN. By the theory, in the x=-2 
treatment, choosing IN is self-serving, as the FM stands to gain up to $22, whereas the 
SM stands to gain only up to $20. The negative outside option is implemented by a 
reduction in the subject’s show-up fee. 
Additionally, in a questionnaire administered at the end of the experiment we elicit 
subject perceptions about generosity in a non-salient way. On a 5-point scale (Likert 
1932), where 1 is not generous and 5 is very generous, we ask both the FMs and SMs 
whether they considered the FM’s choice of IN to be generous. This manipulation 
check allows us to shed further light on the potential MGT ordering. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
The crux of our experiment, testing whether potential self-serving considerations 
behind generous behavior are important to reciprocity, comes down to the following 
three main hypotheses. For the ease of explanation, we present the hypotheses (and 
results) in parallel to the Revealed Altruism theory, i.e. we first establish support for 
whether the MGT ordering holds and only then focus on the MAT response, which is 
directly related to our research question. 
We conjecture that choosing IN in the Selfless x=4 treatment is MGT to choosing IN 
in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment, as the two actions are of equivalent MGT ordering 
by Condition A, but vary by Condition B. Firstly, if an action has a higher MGT 
ordering, then we expect FMs and SMs to perceive that action as being more 
generous.
5
 
H1a: FMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Selfless 
treatment x=4 than in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. 
H1b: SMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Selfless 
x=4 treatment than in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. 
Secondly, since choosing IN is self-serving for the FM when x=-2, and selfless for the 
FM when x=4, we expect that more FMs will choose IN when doing so is self-
serving: 
H2: FMs will choose IN more often in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment than in 
the Selfless x=4 treatment. 
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In Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), x took the values of 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.  In our experiment we 
chose x=4 for replication purposes, and x=-2 as it was the first negative instance counting down in steps 
of three from x=4. 
5
 Note that while MGT and MAT orderings are defined as weak relations (see Cox et al., 2008), we 
formulate our hypotheses as strong inequalities, for a more conservative test of our proposed 
conjecture. 
Finally, in the theory of Revealed Altruism a MGT action elicits a MAT response. In 
our design SMs should therefore allocate a larger proportion of the $20 to the FM (y) 
if choosing IN is indeed MGT. 
H3: SMs will choose a higher y in the Selfless x=4 treatment than in the Self-
Serving x=-2 treatment.  
 
3.3. Procedures 
The experiment was run in the New Zealand Experiment Economics Laboratory at the 
University of Canterbury. 154 student subjects, recruited using the online recruitment 
system ORSEE (Greiner 2015), participated, with 74 subjects (= 37 observations) in 
the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment, and 80 subjects (= 40 observations) in the Selfless 
x=4 treatment. Subjects participated in one treatment only, making this design 
between-subjects. Subjects were on average paid NZ$ 18.78, with all sessions lasting 
approximately 50 minutes.
6
 In a session, subjects were checked-in, signed a consent 
form, and then handed neutrally framed instructions (included in Appendix A). They 
were given approximately three minutes to read the instructions by themselves, after 
which the instructions were read aloud while also projected onto a screen at the front 
of the lab. Subjects made their decisions in a program implemented in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Each terminal was randomly assigned a pair and role by the 
software. FMs chose IN or OUT by selecting the relevant radio button on the 
computer screen. If a FM chose OUT, he would receive $x (x=4 or x=-2 depending on 
treatment) and the SM would receive nothing. The $-2 outside option was enforced by 
reducing the FMs’ $5 show-up fee to $3, so instead of receiving $5 in addition to their 
experiment earnings, they would receive $3. As the FMs were making their decision, 
SMs chose how much money to allocate to the FM, y, conditional on the FM choosing 
IN, i.e. the game was played using the strategy method (Selten 1967, Brandts & 
Charness 2011). If a FM chose IN, then the division of the $20 the SM decided on 
would be enacted. After all subjects had completed their decisions, they were 
informed they were to receive $5 for filling out a questionnaire. Finally, subjects were 
asked to come to the payout room one by one to receive their earnings in private, and 
then left the lab. The experimenter was aware of an individual’s payout, making the 
social distance protocol single-blind.  
 
3.4. Results 
Table 1 reports summary statistics and tests for both FMs and SMs. Recall that both 
FMs and SMs were asked on a non-salient 5-point scale how generous they thought 
choosing IN was (with 5 being very generous, and 1 being not generous). H1a and 
H1b predicts that choosing IN when doing so is selfless will be considered more 
generous than choosing IN when it is self-serving. FMs reported an average 
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 Minimum wage in New Zealand was NZ$13.50 per hour at the time of the experiments. 
generosity perception of 3.83 in the Selfless x=4 treatment, and 3.14 in the Self-
Serving x=-2 treatment. The averages are in the direction posited by H1a, and the 
difference is statistically significant with the Mann-Whitney 2-sided test reporting 
p=.029.
7
 We therefore find evidence in support of H1a. 
 
Table 1 – Experiment 1 Summary Statistics and Tests 
Panel A: First Movers 
Treatment Fraction that 
chose IN 
(percentage) 
Fisher’s 
Exact 
Test 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mann-Whitney 
 
x=-2 (Self-
Serving) 
35/37 (95%) .049 3.14 
(1.42) 
.029 
 
x=4 (Selfless) 31/40 (78%) 3.83 
(1.03) 
Panel B: Second Movers 
Treatment Mean y 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mann-Whitney 
 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mann-
Whitney 
 
x=-2 (Self-
Serving) 
5.42 
(3.64) 
.992 
 
2.73 
(1.35) 
.064 
 
x=4 (Selfless) 5.45 
(3.52) 
3.30 
(1.11) 
All reported p-values are two-sided. 
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 We adopt a conservative approach and report 2-sided tests throughout the paper. 
 Figure 3 – Experiment 1 SMs y decision by treatment 
 
SMs reported an average generosity perception of 3.30 in the Selfless x=4 treatment, 
and 2.73 in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. The averages are in the direction posited, 
and are statistically significant at the 10% level, with the Mann-Whitney test reporting 
p=.064.
8
 Our non-saliently elicited data thus provides evidence for H1b, that SMs 
consider choosing IN as being more generous when x=4 than when x=-2, in line with 
our conjecture. 
Choosing IN in the current experiment was designed to be self-serving for the FM 
when x=-2, and selfless for the FM when x=4. H2 therefore predicted that more FMs 
will choose IN when doing so is self-serving than when it is selfless. Evidence 
presented in Panel A of Table 1 supports H3 as 95% of FMs chose IN in the x=-2 
treatment and 78% of FMs chose IN in the x=4 treatment. This difference is 
statistically significant according to the Fisher’s exact test (p=.049). 
Our design thus passes an important manipulation checks: Both FMs and SMs 
consider choosing IN to be more generous in the Selfless x=4 treatment than in the 
Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. FMs additionally choose IN more often when doing so is 
self-serving.  
We now move onto SM behavior. If SMs consider IN being of differing levels of 
generosity, i.e. H1b is supported, then our reciprocity conjecture implies that SMs will 
subsequently be inclined to allocate more to the FM when IN is considered more 
generous, as predicted by H3.  
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 A Mann-Whitney test on pooled data from both FMs and SMs reports p=.007. 
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However, Table 1 reports no evidence in favor of H3. On average, SMs allocate 5.42 
to FMs in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment, and 5.45 in the Selfless x=4 treatment, and 
there is no statistically significant difference (p=.992). We therefore reject H3 that 
SMs choose a higher y in the Selfless x=4 treatment than in the Self-Serving x=-2 
treatment. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
H1a and H1b support our conjecture, based on a proposed revision of MGT ordering, 
as both FMs and SMs perceive our selfless treatment to be more generous than our 
self-serving treatment. However, H3 does not support our MGT revision, as it has not 
borne out that an MGT action has elicited a MAT response, an important part of 
Revealed Altruism. Our finding of evidence in support of H1 but finding a lack of 
support for H3 is puzzling. SMs consider FMs to be less generous when they choose 
IN in our self-serving treatment, however, this elicits no difference in reciprocal 
response towards FMs. This is inconsistent with the basic logic behind the concept of 
reciprocity. 
However, the empirical evidence of the LWG has shown that typically varying x does 
not have an effect on y (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; Servátka & Vadovič 2009; 
Cox, Servátka & Vadovič, 2010; and also the no negotiations treatments in 
Dufwenberg, Servátka & Vadovič, 2016). In light of this, Experiment 1 was perhaps a 
too conservative test of our conjecture. Our findings may be an artefact of the Lost 
Wallet Game itself. It is therefore prudent to check the robustness of our findings in a 
different experimental design, which we present next. 
4. Experiment 2 
4.1.Design 
For Experiment 2 we use the Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995). 
Unlike the Lost Wallet Game, Investment Game experiments have found SM 
behavior to be responsive to choices made by the FM (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), and 
will thus present a less conservative test of our conjecture. Recall that in order to test 
whether self-serving generosity leads to a weaker reciprocal response, we must hold 
Condition A constant while varying Condition B. One way of achieving this is in the 
Investment Game is to use different exchange rates on amounts kept by the SM, and 
amounts returned to the FM by the SM. To implement such exchange rates we adapt 
the procedures used by Andreoni & Miller (2002) for use in the Investment Game. 
Figure 4 presents our design. 
  
 Figure 4: Our Modified Investment Game 
 
The FM starts with ten tokens, and can choose IN or OUT. If the FM chooses OUT, 
then he earns ten points. If the FM chooses IN, then the ten tokens are made available 
for the SM to split. In all treatments, tokens that the SM holds for herself earn her 
three points per token, which holds Condition A constant across treatments.
9
 Tokens 
that the SM decides to send to the FM earn the FM s points, depending on treatment. 
By varying s we control how selfless or self-serving a FM choosing IN is. Note that 
the ‘channel’ in which we alter Condition B is different from Experiment 1, where the 
outside option was varied. The ‘channel’ is altered as a robustness check of 
Experiment 1, to avoid the potential artefactual issues of the LWG described 
previously. Choosing IN when s=4 is neither selfless nor self-serving by our 
definition, as FMs have a maximum potential gain of 30 (they forgo 10 points to 
choose IN), which is the same as the SM’s maximum potential gain of 30 (which is 
invariant in s). Values of s smaller than 4 result in the choice of IN being selfless, and 
values larger than 4 result in the choice of IN being self-serving. We fix our Selfless 
treatment as s=2, and our Self-Serving treatment as s=6, to ensure sufficient and equal 
distance from our what would be ‘neutral’ s=4. 
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 Note the deliberate similarity to the Investment Game, where amounts invested by the FM are 
typically tripled for the SM to split. 
Andreoni & Miller (2002) report that in their Dictator Game, a non-trivial number of 
subjects exhibit a desire to maximize surplus. If SMs behave similarly in our 
experiment, then they will want to allocate more tokens to FMs when s=6, as this 
maximizes surplus. This is a potential confound, and acts in the opposite direction of 
our hypothesis. In order to control for this, we implement a third Random treatment 
where there is a 50% chance s=2 eventuates, and a 50% chance s=6 eventuates. SMs 
are informed which outcome has eventuated prior to their decision, whereas FMs are 
not. The expected value of s is 4, so a FM choosing IN is being neither selfless nor 
self-serving in the Random treatment. Taking advantage of this fact, and comparing 
SM reaction to selfless or self-serving FM actions (where s is fixed prior to the FM 
decision to be 2 and 6, respectively) to the corresponding neutral FM actions, we can 
separate out the confound of surplus maximization, as well as individually separate 
out a SMs response to a selfless or self-serving FM action. Table 2 presents this 
separation of potential effects, with isolated effects in bold. 
 
Table 2 – Separation of Effects in Experiment 2 
 Fixed s=6 Random s=2 Random s=6 
Fixed s=2 Selflessness Effect 
Self-Serving Effect 
Surplus 
Maximization 
Selflessness Effect Selflessness Effect 
Surplus Maximization 
Fixed s=6 --- Self-Serving Effect 
Surplus 
Maximization 
Self-Serving Effect 
Random 
s=2 
--- --- Surplus 
Maximization 
Fixed s=2 and s=6 represent the respective treatments where s is fixed prior to the FM’s decision. 
Random s=2 represents the random treatment when s=2 eventuated. Random s=6 represents the 
random treatment when s=6 eventuated. 
 
4.2.Hypotheses 
Our conjecture remains the same as in Experiment 1, while our hypotheses change to 
fit the design of Experiment 2. Both FMs and SMs should perceive our Selfless s=2 
treatment to be more generous than both our neutral Random treatment and Self-
Serving s=6 treatment. FMs and SMs should also consider our neutral Random 
treatment to be more generous than our Self-serving s=6 treatment. 
H4a: FMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Selfless 
s=2 treatment than in the Random treatment. 
H4b: SMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Selfless 
s=2 treatment than in the Random treatment. 
H5a: FMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Selfless 
s=2 treatment than in the Self-Serving s=6 treatment. 
H5b: SMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Selfless 
s=2 treatment than in the Self-Serving s=6 treatment. 
H6a: FMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Random 
treatment than in the Self-Serving s=6 treatment. 
H6b: SMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the Random 
treatment than in the Self-Serving s=6 treatment. 
Just as in Experiment 1, we expect the FMs’ behavior to correspond to how self-
serving or selfless choosing IN is. 
H7: FMs will choose IN more often in the Random treatment than in the 
Selfless s=2 treatment. 
H8: FMs will choose IN more often in the Self-serving s=6 treatment than in 
the Random treatment. 
H9: FMs will choose IN more often in the Self-serving s=6 treatment than in 
the Selfless s=2 treatment. 
In terms of SM behavior, we focus our analysis on the isolated effects presented in 
Table 2. For the selflessness effect, we predict that SMs will allocate more to the FM 
in the Selfless s=2 treatment than when s=2 eventuates in the Random treatment. Such 
a reaction would be triggered by the FM being selfless by choosing IN when s is fixed 
to be 2, as opposed to having neither selfless nor self-serving intentions by choosing 
IN in the Random treatment. According to our conjecture, SMs may want to reward 
selflessly generous FMs more than neutrally generous FMs. 
An important consideration in our design is that because of the different token 
redemption rates between our treatments, the number of tokens allocated to the FM 
might vary because of the different redemption rate, rather than due to a change in 
reciprocity. Therefore, rather than stating our hypotheses using the number of tokens 
allocated to the FM, we formulate them in terms of the percentage of the total surplus.  
H10: SMs will allocate more surplus to the FM in the Selfless s=2 treatment 
than when s=2 eventuates in the Random treatment.  
For the self-serving effect, we expect that SMs will allocate more of the surplus to the 
FM in the Random treatment where s=6 eventuates than in the Self-Serving s=6 
treatment, as SMs may wish to reward neutrally generous FMs more than self-serving 
generous FMs. 
H11: SMs will allocate more surplus to the FM when s=6 eventuates in the 
Random treatment than in the Self-Serving s=6 treatment.  
Finally, for the surplus maximization effect, we compare the two possible states of 
nature in the Random Treatment. We expect that SMs will allocate more of the 
surplus to the FM when s=6 eventuates, as it maximizes surplus, and it is relatively 
cheaper to do so. 
H12: In the Random treatment SMs will allocate more surplus to the FM when 
s=6 eventuates than when s=2 eventuates. 
 
4.3.Procedures 
Experiment 2 was also run in the New Zealand Experiment Economics Laboratory at 
the University of Canterbury. 222 subjects participated in total, with 64 subjects (= 32 
observations) in the Selfless s=2 treatment, 64 subjects (= 32 observations) in the 
Self-Serving s=6 treatment, and 94 subjects (=47 observations) in the Random 
treatment. None of the Experiment 2 subjects participated in Experiment 1. Subjects 
were paid on average NZ$17.69, with all sessions lasting approximately 50 minutes. 
The procedures used in Experiment 2 replicate those of Experiment1. FMs made their 
IN or OUT decision by selecting the relevant option on their screen. If a FM chose 
OUT, then he would earn 10 points and his paired SM would earn 0 points. While the 
FMs were making their decisions, SMs were deciding how many of the 10 tokens to 
send to the FM and how many to keep for themselves, provided the FM chose IN. 
Tokens sent to the FM earns him s points and tokens kept by the SM earns her 3 
points. In the Random treatment, FMs were not informed of the realization of s when 
making their decision. SMs were informed of the realization of s before making their 
decision, and only made a decision for that realization of s. If a FM chose IN, then the 
proposed division of tokens by the SM would be implemented. After all subjects had 
completed their decisions, they were informed they were to receive $5 for filling out a 
questionnaire. After subjects had completed the questionnaires, they were asked to 
come one by one to the payout room to receive their earnings in private, where the 
points earned in the experiment were exchanged at the preannounced rate of $.60NZD 
per point.  
4.4.Results 
Table 3 reports summary statistics and statistical tests on both FM and SM behavior in 
Experiment 2. Because of our focus on isolating individual effects, we provide 
pairwise comparisons and statistical tests. 
We start by exploring subject’s non-salient generosity perceptions. Hypotheses H4a 
and H4b predict that choosing IN in the Selfless treatment will be perceived to be 
more generous than in the Random treatment. Hypotheses H5a and H5b predict that 
choosing IN in the Selfless treatment will be perceived to be more generous than in 
the Self-Serving treatment and hypotheses H6a and H6b that choosing IN will be 
perceived to be more generous in the Random treatment than in the Self-Serving 
treatment. 
FMs reported an average generosity perception of 3.94 in the Selfless treatment, 3.70 
in the Random treatment, and 3.59 in the Self-serving treatment. While the averages 
are in the hypothesized directions, there are no statistically significant differences 
between any of our treatments. We find no evidence in support of H4a, H5a, or H6a. 
SMs reported an average generosity perception of 4.03 in the Selfless treatment, 3.72 
in the Random treatment, and 3.56 in the Self-Serving treatment. As with FMs, the 
averages are in the hypothesized direction, but unlike FMs, there exists a weak 
statistical difference between the Selfless and Self-Serving treatments, with the Mann 
Whitney test reporting p=.082.
10
 Therefore, there is some weak evidence in support of 
H5b, which is the most relevant comparison from the perspective of our research 
question. SMs may gain a better grasp of generosity considerations through actually 
making their decision, which would explain the discrepancy between our evidence in 
support of H5a and H5b. We find no support for H4b and H6b. Regarding our 
findings on the differences in generosity perceptions being weaker in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 1, we note that it may be due to the increased complexity of 
Experiment 2, or the calibration providing a smaller magnitude of separation in 
generosity perception. 
We continue the analysis with the FM behavior. 44% of FMs chose IN in the Selfless 
treatment, 81% in the Random treatment, and 66% in the Self-Serving treatment. The 
Fisher’s Exact Test only reports a statistically significant difference in FM behavior 
between the Random and Selfless treatment (p=.001) with the difference between the 
Selfless and Self-Serving treatment being marginally insignificant (p=.131). We 
therefore find evidence in support of H7, but not for H8 and H9.  
As mentioned earlier, when analyzing SM decisions, it is helpful to report the 
percentage of the surplus allocated to the FM instead of the number of tokens for the 
comparison between treatments with differing token redemption rates. For 
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 Using pooled data of both FM and SM generosity perceptions, a Mann-Whitney test reports: for H4 
p=.073; for H5 p=.035; and for H6 p=.536.  Note that such an approach provides support for H5 and 
mild evidence in support of H4.  
comparability between all SM results, we report this percentage for all our 
comparisons on SM behavior, even though such an approach is only required for H10. 
We now test our hypotheses on SM behavior, starting with isolating the ‘selflessness 
effect’. Hypothesis H10 predicts that SMs will allocate more of the surplus to the FM 
in the Selfless treatment than in the neutral Random treatment, where the same token 
redemption rate s=2 eventuates. The intuition behind the hypothesis is that SMs may 
want to more highly reward those FMs who exhibit selfless generosity, than those 
FMs who exhibit neutral generosity. 
In the Selfless s=2 treatment, SMs on average allocated 27.0% of the surplus to FMs, 
while in the Random treatment where s=2 eventuated SMs on average allocated 
20.7%. The averages are in the hypothesized direction, however, this result is not 
statistically significant (p=.245). Therefore, we find no evidence in support of H10. 
In a similar line of reasoning to the selflessness effect, we hypothesize that SMs will 
respond by diminishing their reciprocity due to the ‘self-servingness’ effect as they 
may not want to reward FMs whose intentions could be self-serving. Hypothesis H11, 
capturing this effect, predicts that SMs will allocate more surplus in the neutral 
Random treatment where s=6 has eventuated by chance compared to the Self-serving 
s=6 treatment. 
In the Self-Serving s=6 treatment, SMs on average allocated 40.4% of the surplus to 
FMs, while in the Random treatment where s=6 eventuated SMs on average allocated 
50.1%. The averages are in the hypothesized direction, however, the difference is 
marginally insignificant (p=.142). Therefore, we find no evidence in support of H11. 
Our last hypothesis, H12, explores the need for our Random treatment to control for 
the possibility that SMs may wish to maximize surplus by allocating more to the FM 
when the redemption rate is higher. To do this, we compare the SM response to s=2 
and s=6 within our Random treatment. As the FM’s intentions are constant in the 
Random treatment, we can focus on the effect of the differing s. 
  
Table 3 – Experiment 2 Summary Statistics and Tests 
Panel A: First Movers 
Treatment Fraction 
that chose 
IN 
(percentage) 
Fisher’s 
Exact Test 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(st. dev.) 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
 
Selfless s=2  14/32 (44%) .131 .001
a
 3.94 
(1.01) 
 .205 
 
.249
b
 
 
Self-Serving 
s=6  
21/32 (66%) .187 3.59 
(1.13) 
.702 
 
Random  38/47 (81%) .001
a
 3.70 
(0.95) 
.249
b
 
 
Panel B: Second Movers 
Treatment Mean 
Surplus 
allocated 
to FM 
(st. dev.) 
Mann-Whitney 
 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(st. dev.) 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
 
Selfless s=2  27.0% 
(19.1%) 
.013 
 
.245
c
 
 
4.03 
(1.03) 
.082 
 
.277
e
 
 
Self-serving 
s=6  
40.4% 
(24.6%) 
.142
d
 
 
3.56 
(1.13) 
.855 
 
Random s=2  20.7% 
(19.7%) 
.0001 
 
.245
c
 
 
3.72 
(1.19) 
.277
e
 
 
Random s=6  50.1% 
(23.2%) 
.142
d
 
 
In the Selfless treatment s is fixed at 2; in the Self-Serving treatment s is fixed at 6. In the Random 
treatment s=2 and s=6 eventuates with 50% probability each. 
Statistical tests of differences are grouped in the same cell corresponding to the treatments in the same 
rows. Where this is not possible, p-values are reported twice in the same rows as the corresponding 
treatments, and paired using a letter superscript. 
All reported tests are 2-sided. 
 
 Figure 5 – Experiment 2 - SM surplus allocation decision CDFs when s=2 by 
treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Experiment 2 - SM surplus allocation decision CDFs when s=6 by 
treatment 
 
 
When s=6 eventuated in the Random treatment, SMs allocated on average 50.1% of 
the surplus to FMs, whereas SMs allocated on average 20.7% when s=2 eventuated. 
This result is statistically significant (p=.0001), and provides strong evidence for H12. 
This finding justifies the need for our Random treatment to control for surplus 
maximization effects. If this effect was not controlled for, a confounded test of a 
combined selfless and self-serving effect, which directly compares SM behavior 
between our Selfless and Self-Serving treatment, would report a statistically 
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significant difference (p=.013). To use this as evidence of self-serving generosity 
affecting reciprocity would be erroneous due to the presence of the surplus 
maximization effect. Alternatively, to separate out selfless and self-serving effects, 
one could introduce a treatment where s=4 without a random element. Such an 
approach would also be erroneous due to the presence of the surplus maximization 
effect. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Life is full of examples where people pretend to be kind, but do so because their 
exhibited kindness has the potential to benefit them. Do beneficiaries of such kind 
actions care about their self-serving nature and take it into account when responding? 
Our intuition, supported by prior empirical evidence on the importance of intentions, 
tells us they might care. We set out to study whether self-serving generosity, which is 
a particular type of kindness, affects reciprocal behavior. The novelty of our approach 
lies in manipulating the nature of intentions (as opposed to only removing them), 
which is central to understanding of reciprocal preferences. 
Utilizing the framework of Revealed Altruism, we developed a conjecture on how 
selfless and self-serving generosity impacts reciprocal behavior. We defined actions 
that satisfied Revealed Altruism’s Condition B to be selfless, and actions that violated 
Condition B to be self-serving. We proposed that selfless actions are MGT self-
serving actions, and should therefore elicit a MAT response. Using novel designs that 
varied Condition B while holding other MGT considerations constant (mainly 
Condition A), we found no difference in reciprocal response to selfless and self-
serving (but equally generous) offers. This is despite the fact that subjects generally 
considered our selfless and self-serving treatments to be of differing levels of 
generosity. 
Most theories of (positive) reciprocity can generally be condensed down to a desire to 
reward generous actions. It follows that the desire to reward would increase with how 
generous the action is, meaning our finding of differences in generosity perception but 
not reciprocal behavior is puzzling. However, our elicitation of subjects’ generosity 
perception was non-salient, so this finding might not replicate with an elicitation 
utilizing a salient proper scoring rule (see Schlag, Tremewan & van der Weele, 2015, 
for a review).
 
Our elicitation directly followed an announcement that subjects would 
be paid (a previously unannounced) $5 for the elicitation, which should minimize 
issues such as lack of cognitive effort. 
SM behavior in our experiments may be explained by SMs giving FMs the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’, and assuming FMs have selfless rather than self-serving intentions when 
both could be present, a finding akin to Cox & Deck (2006). A design where FMs 
must choose a self-serving generous option over a selfless or neutral generous option 
could control for the ‘benefit of the doubt’. However, such a design would likely 
require the use of ‘inefficient strategies’ (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004), 
characterized by the existence of another strategy that for at least one player increases 
material payout without reducing the payout of other players. In such a design, our 
conjectured effects would be confounded by inefficient alternatives potentially not 
being considered credible. 
Apart from providing empirical evidence that people do not seem to respond to self-
serving intentions, our results have important theoretical implications. In particular, 
our data suggest that Revealed Altruism might not need the restriction of Condition B 
in a MGT ordering, as it appears to have no impact on the MAT response and that a 
‘MGT light’ ordering (proposed by CFS, p.36), which only includes Condition A, 
may be sufficient. Such a refinement of Revealed Altruism would increase the 
parsimony of the theory, without reducing its descriptive and predictive properties. A 
SM appears to only consider what a generous action means for her own payoff, and 
this consideration appears to dominate any ulterior intentions a FM may have. 
However, we also acknowledge that more research would be required to confidently 
remove Condition B from Revealed Altruism, such as investigating Condition B’s 
effects over negative reciprocity, and investigating the potential interaction effects of 
Condition A and B.  
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Appendix A – Experiment 1 Instructions 
 
Instructions in ( ) are relevant to the x=-2 treatment, and  [ ] to the x=4 treatment. 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in 
the experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group 1 and Group 2. Each 
person in Group 1 will be anonymously paired with a person in Group 2.  No one will 
learn the identity of the person he/she is paired with. 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is computerized, meaning you will be entering your decisions on the 
computer in front of you.  If you have any trouble entering your decisions, please raise 
your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you. 
The Group 1 Decision Task 
Each person in Group 1 will have two options: 
 (To choose OUT and receive $-2, which will be subtracted from their show 
up fee.) [To choose OUT and receive $4.] In this case the paired Group 2 
person with whom he/she is paired makes no decision. 
 To choose IN. In that case the paired person in Group 2 will get to split $20 
between the pair. That is, the person in Group 2 will decide how much of the 
$20, between $0 and $20, to give to the person in Group 1, and how much to 
keep. 
Group 1 persons enter their decisions by selecting the relevant option on the screen, 
followed by clicking OK. 
The Group 2 Decision Task 
If the Group 1 person chooses IN, then $20 will be made available to split between 
the two paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group 2 person.  Each 
Group 2 person will be asked to decide how much money out of $20 to give to the 
Group 1 person with whom he/she is paired. Group 2 persons are asked to enter their 
decision in the relevant text box followed by clicking OK.  Note that this decision by 
the Group 2 person will only be relevant if the Group 1 person chose IN. 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once all 
Group 2 persons have made their decisions, you will be presented with a summary 
screen of your earnings.  Click OK after you have seen this screen, so other 
participants cannot see your decisions.  You will then be prompted to complete a 
Questionnaire.  After the Questionnaire, you will be asked one by one to enter the 
payment room at the back of the lab for the payment of your earnings. Because your 
decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings 
either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after 
you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
  
Appendix B – Experiment 2 Instructions 
(Fixed Treatments) 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in 
the experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group 1 and Group 2. Each 
person in Group 1 will be anonymously paired with a person in Group 2. No one will 
learn the identity of the person he/she is paired with. 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is computerised, meaning you will be entering your decisions on the 
computer in front of you.  If you have any trouble entering your decisions, please raise 
your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you. 
Tokens and Points 
The currency used in this experiment are Tokens.  As you make decisions with these 
Tokens, you and your paired person will earn points.  Every point that people earn in 
this experiment will be worth 60 cents.  For example, if you earn 8 points you will 
make $4.80 from the decision part of the experiment. 
The Group 1 Decision Task 
Each person in Group 1 will have two options: 
 To choose OUT and receive 10 Tokens, earning 10 points.  In this case the 
paired Group 2 person with whom he/she is paired makes no decision, and 
earns 0 points. 
 To choose IN. In that case the paired person in Group 2 will get to split 10 
Tokens between the pair. That is, the person in Group 2 will decide how 
many of the 10 Tokens, to pass to the person in Group 1, and how many to 
hold for themselves.  Tokens that are passed or held will earn different 
amounts of points, which is explained in the Group 2 Decision Task.   
Group 1 persons enter their decision by selecting the relevant option on the screen, 
followed by clicking OK. 
The Group 2 Decision Task 
If the Group 1 person chooses IN, then 10 Tokens will be made available to split 
between the two paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group 2 person.  
Each Group 2 person will be asked to decide how many Tokens out of 10 to pass to 
the Group 1 person with whom he/she is paired, and how many Tokens to hold for 
themselves.  Each Group 2 person must distribute all 10 Tokens, that is, the number of 
Tokens they pass and the number of Tokens they hold must sum to 10.  
 Tokens that are passed will earn their paired Group 1 person s points per 
Token.   
 Tokens that are held (i.e. the remainder of the 10 Tokens that are not passed) 
will earn the Group 2 person 3 points per Token.  
 
Group 2 persons enter their decisions in the relevant text box, followed by clicking 
OK.  Note that this decision by the Group 2 person will only be relevant if the Group 
1 person chose IN. 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once 
everybody has made their decisions, you will be presented with a screen instructing 
you to wait.  Do not click OK until the experimenter asks you to do so. You will then 
answer a questionnaire, followed by a summary of your earnings, and finally another 
questionnaire.  Once this is complete, you will be asked one by one to enter the 
payment room at the back of the lab for the payment of your earnings. Because your 
decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings 
either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after 
you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
 
(Random Treatment) 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in 
the experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group 1 and Group 2. Each 
person in Group 1 will be anonymously paired with a person in Group 2. No one will 
learn the identity of the person he/she is paired with. 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is computerised, meaning you will be entering your decisions on the 
computer in front of you.  If you have any trouble entering your decisions, please raise 
your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you. 
 
 
Tokens and Points 
The currency used in this experiment are Tokens.  As you make decisions with these 
Tokens, you and your paired person will earn points.  Every point that people earn in 
this experiment will be worth 60 cents.  For example, if you earn 8 points you will 
make $4.80 from the decision part of the experiment. 
The Group 1 Decision Task 
Each person in Group 1 will have two options: 
 To choose OUT and receive 10 Tokens, earning 10 points.  In this case the 
paired Group 2 person with whom he/she is paired makes no decision, and 
earns 0 points. 
 To choose IN. In that case the paired person in Group 2 will get to split 10 
Tokens between the pair. That is, the person in Group 2 will decide how 
many of the 10 Tokens, to pass to the person in Group 1, and how many to 
hold for themselves.  Tokens that are passed or held will earn different 
amounts of points, depending on which Situation occurs, which is explained 
in the Group 2 Decision Task.   
Group 1 persons will not be informed which Situation has occurred prior to making 
their decision. Group 1 persons enter their decision by selecting the relevant option on 
the screen, followed by clicking OK. 
The Group 2 Decision Task 
If the Group 1 person chooses IN, then 10 Tokens will be made available to split 
between the two paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group 2 person.  
Each Group 2 person will be asked to decide how many Tokens out of 10 to pass to 
the Group 1 person with whom he/she is paired, and how many Tokens to hold for 
themselves.  Each Group 2 person must distribute all 10 Tokens, that is, the number of 
Tokens they pass and the number of Tokens they hold must sum to 10.  
The software will generate a random number to determine which Situation will occur.  
There is a 50% chance of Situation A occurring, and a 50% chance of Situation B 
occurring. 
If Situation A occurs, then tokens will earn points in the following way: 
 Tokens that are passed will earn their paired Group 1 person 2 points per 
Token.   
 Tokens that are held (i.e. the remainder of the 10 tokens not passed) will earn 
the Group 2 person 3 points per Token.  
If Situation B occurs, then tokens will earn points in the following way: 
 Tokens that are passed will earn their paired Group 1 person 6 points per 
Token.   
 Tokens that are held (i.e. the remainder of the 10 tokens not passed) will earn 
the Group 2 person 3 points per Token.  
Group 2 persons will be informed which Situation has occurred, and then asked to 
enter their decisions in the relevant text boxes, followed by clicking OK.  Note that 
this decision by the Group 2 person will only be relevant if the Group 1 person chose 
IN. 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once 
everybody has made their decisions, you will be presented with a screen instructing 
you to wait.  Do not click OK until the experimenter asks you to do so. You will then 
answer a questionnaire, followed by a summary of your earnings, and finally another 
questionnaire.  Once this is complete, you will be asked one by one to enter the 
payment room at the back of the lab for the payment of your earnings. Because your 
decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings 
either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after 
you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
 
